Introduction
The process by which new technologies pass from research and development into widespread commercial use has been the focus of much attention in ' ' recent years.
The proper role of the government in the diffusion process has been at the center of this attention. The issue has been joined in regard to the development of synthetic fuels and the arguments for and against government subsidy to encourage early commercialization of these new technologies.
The policy debate has centered on the wisdom of government subsidy for the construction of large-scale commercial plants. The analysis of informational externalities in this paper also provides insight as to why early estimation of nuclear power costs were so wrong. The learning effects are estimated from the following model:
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The effect of delcTys
In all discussions of the costs of nuclear power a large importance has been attributed to long lags in construction. This is confirmed by our estimates. Doubling the planned construction period, ETIME, more than doubles the real cost of the plant as measured by a^. Unanticipated delays, as measured by a,, also positively affect costs although their effect is estimated to be much less important.
The actual effects of delays were quite different than anticipated.
The estimate of (a.-B^) in equation (2) suggests that the effect of delay on cost was not taken into account in forming initial estimates of cost.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that e^- 
Learning-by-doing
The results presented in Table 2 Assume that utilities were expected cost minimizers. The utilities were choosing between nuclear power and the best fossil-fuel alternative.
In most cases the alternative was coal power. We characterize their decision rule with respect to technology adoption as follows. Equation (3) can be Interpreted In the following way. Utilities will choose the cheapest generation alternative. Part of the cost of generation is observed capital, fuel, and operation and maintenance cost. Another part of the cost cannot be observed by an analyst. For example, the perceptions of the utility about public acceptance of a nuclear plant might significantly influence choice, yet is generally unobservable. Site-specific items that are not easily observed might affect desirability of one technology or another. Thus €" and e" will be known to the utility, but will not in general be known by the researcher examining the behavior of the utilities.
For any given set of observed fuel, capital, operation and maintenance there is therefore a probability between zero and one that the utility in question would choose nuclear power.
Assume that log e , log e are normally distributed with zero mean.
Thus log e is also normally distributed with zero mean. The probability of any individual utility choosing nuclear power is simply: There is an Issue as to whether these estimates were believed. There appears to be no reason why in reporting the expected cost a utility would be biased one way or another. The cost estimate typically was reported in a prospectus or to a regulatory commission. Low estimates would enhance the acceptance by the financial community, but ultimately make the utilities look incompetent when they asked the regulatory commission to include the actual cost in the rate base.
There is a possible statistical reason for the underestimation bias.
We observe the costs of nuclear plants actually built. For these plants, the utility decided that costs would be cheaper than for all alternatives. Therefore, it is possible that those plants that are built are, on average, those for which costs are underestimated.
It is unlikely that this would explain the underestimate for each plant in the sample.
Furthermore, this provides no explanation for the systematic relationship of bias, as measured by equation (2) , to experience.
9.
The null hypothesis that g = a^cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of confidence.
10.
This conflicts with earlier results by Mooz (Ref. 8 We express cost as a percent of initial cost since future cost developments were not anticipated as the results above suggest.
lA.
I am indebted to Rodney Smith for discussion on this issue. 15. This assumes that the individual project will not affect price.
For a full-scale estimation of such a model, see Zimmerman and Ellis (1980).
16.
Oil was an alternative for baseload generation primarily on the East and West coasts. Our estimates below are all for the Midwest where coal was the only alternative to nuclear power.
17.
The irony here is that more knowledge about true costs would have resulted in fewer plants being built. Proponents of subsidies for synfuels see it as a way of expanding the role of the technology.
